

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.212
1 September 1964
ENGLISH

OF MICHIGAN

NOV 11 1964

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND TWELFTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 1 September 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

(Italy)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO

Mr. E. KOSANNIAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV

Mr. G. GHELEV

Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA

U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Mr. C.J. MARSHALL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. KLUSAK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. A. MIKULIN

Mr. J. CHMELA

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU

Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU

Mr. K.P. LUKOSE

Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. R. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDON

Mr. M. TELLO

Mr. J. MERCADO

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. L.C.N. OBI
<u>Poland:</u>	Mr. J. GOLDBLAT Mr. E. STANIEWSKI Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI
<u>Romania:</u>	Mr. V. DUMITRESCU Mr. E. GLASER Mr. C. UNGUREANU Mr. I. IACOB
<u>Sweden:</u>	Mrs. A. MYRDAL Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD Mr. B. VEGESACK Mr. J. PRAWITZ
<u>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:</u>	Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN Mr. L.I. MENDELYEVICH Mr. S.A. BOGOMOLOV Mr. I.M. PALENYKH
<u>United Arab Republic:</u>	Mr. A.F. HASSAN Mr. A. OSMAN Mr. S. EL FATATRI Mr. M. KASSEM
<u>United Kingdom:</u>	Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN Mr. A.J. WILLIAMS Mr. J.M. EDES
<u>United States of America:</u>	Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE Mr. A. AKALOWSKY Mr. D.S. MACDONALD Mr. R.A. MARTIN
<u>Special Representative of the Secretary-General:</u>	Mr. D. PROTITCH
<u>Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:</u>	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I declare open the 212th meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before calling on the first speaker on my list, I should like to read out the following proposed addition to the communiqué to be issued at the end of today's meeting.
(continued in English)

"At its 212th meeting, on 1 September 1964, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee decided to adjourn this session of the Conference following its plenary meeting on 17 September 1964. The Committee also decided to resume its meetings in Geneva as soon as possible after termination of the consideration of disarmament at the nineteenth session of the General Assembly, on a date to be decided by the two co-Chairmen after consultation with the members of the Committee."

(continued in French)

If there are no objections, I shall request the Secretariat to include that paragraph in today's communiqué.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, with regard to the text, which you have just read out, of the proposed decision of the Committee concerning a recess, I must inform the Committee of the following: The Soviet delegation is prepared to continue the negotiations on disarmament in the Eighteen-Nation Committee without any recess. However, if the majority of the members of the Committee consider it appropriate to have a recess, there will be no objection on our part.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): If there are no other comments, I take note of the fact that the Soviet delegation is not opposed to the insertion in the communiqué of the text which I have just read out. I therefore request the Secretariat to include that paragraph in the communiqué to be issued at the end of this meeting.

I have another communication from the two co-Chairmen. It is as follows:

(continued in English)

"The Co-Chairmen recommend to the Committee that the meeting on 10 September be devoted to measures aimed at reducing the armament race and at lessening international tension (topic suggested for discussion by the delegation of the Soviet Union; the delegation of the Soviet Union will communicate this topic to the Committee not later than one week before this meeting).

"As with prior procedural arrangements, this schedule will not preclude any delegation from raising or discussing any subject in any plenary meeting of the Committee. In particular, any delegation may reply at any meeting to statements made at earlier meetings."

(The Chairman, Italy)

(continued in French)

If there are no comments, I shall call on the first speaker on my list, the representative of India.

Mr. NEHRU (India): I should like today on behalf of my delegation to make a brief statement on our negotiations on disarmament. Since the commencement of our last session we have been discussing the question of elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. As we all know, this is the heart of the disarmament problem, and if we could reach an agreement on the question of a working group there would be a considerable advance in our negotiations. However, our present session is drawing to a close, and we shall soon have to make a report to the General Assembly. There is not much time left for further discussions. I think it might be helpful if we were to take this opportunity to review the results of our work during the two sessions.

Both our Eastern and our Western colleagues have expressed their sense of disappointment that no agreement has been reached on the question of a working group. We share their sense of disappointment, but also feel that our discussions have been of some value. In the first place, they have helped us to understand the special concerns and point of view of each side. Secondly, some limited advance or movement towards an agreement has also taken place. Finally, constructive suggestions have been made by the non-aligned delegations for reconciling the differences between the two sides. Neither side has accepted the suggestions, but I think I am right in saying that they have not been totally rejected. The suggestions will no doubt be considered by the General Assembly and the governments concerned. It is our hope that at an early date they may help us to reach an agreement on the question of a working group.

Our own approach to this question was defined in general terms in my statement on 30 June (ENDC/PV.194, pp.10-12). Since then further discussions have taken place in our Committee and many new suggestions have been made. Our own ideas on this question have also evolved, as they should evolve, in the course of the discussions. We have been particularly helped by the valuable contributions of the non-aligned countries. In the light of all these discussions, I should like to make some further suggestions for the consideration of the Committee.

Our approach to this question, I need hardly say, is governed by India's basic policy in regard to nuclear weapons. We have taken a firm decision that our nuclear capabilities shall be used only for peaceful purposes. We have always been opposed and continue to be opposed to the manufacture, use, or possession of nuclear weapons. We

(Mr. Nehru, India)

consider that the use of nuclear weapons is a violation of the Charter and is contrary to the rules of international law. There are some resolutions of the General Assembly which confirm and support our basic policy. The non-aligned countries as a whole have broadly the same policy and have expressed similar views. The United Arab Republic representative recently drew our attention to the declaration of the Organization of African Unity (ENDC/PV.207, p.5). We share the views of the African States on the question of nuclear weapons and non-dissemination. We have also supported the Ethiopian proposal for a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons (A/RES/1909 (XVIII)). Naturally, some special steps will have to be taken to make such a convention effective, but we have supported the proposal in principle.

Speaking on that proposal the other day, the United Kingdom representative said "idealism is not enough" (ENDC/PV.209, p.13). He went on to say that in such matters we should be severely practical. We agree that idealism is not enough; but, as far as nuclear weapons are concerned, I suggest that our policy is a realistic policy. It is not realistic, in our view, even to contemplate the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances. If either side used such weapons, the consequences would be disastrous for both sides and for the world as a whole.

It is our belief that the nuclear Powers have a good understanding of the situation and have tacitly agreed not to use such weapons. Nevertheless the weapons are kept and the nuclear arms race goes on, in spite of the enormous cost and the steadily-increasing threat of nuclear annihilation. Is this, I venture to ask, a realistic policy or a practical approach? In our view, it is more realistic and more in accord with the interests of humanity to aim at the total elimination of all such weapons at the earliest possible date.

However, we know that elimination cannot be brought about by adopting a resolution or by making a declaration, unless one side or the other is prepared to take some unilateral steps. Elimination can take place only on the basis of an agreement. Therefore we welcome any steps which might lead to an early agreement on this question. That is the reason why we, and I believe many other countries, welcomed the Gromyko proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). As immediate elimination does not seem to be acceptable to one of the nuclear sides, the next best alternative is to reduce existing stocks to the lowest agreed level at an early stage of the disarmament process, leading to their total elimination. That would reduce some immediate dangers and at the same time help to ensure more rapid progress towards complete disarmament.

(Mr. Nehru, India)

The lowest agreed level has, however, been described by both the sides as a "nuclear umbrella", or "shield", or "minimum deterrent". This may be a convenient expression, which we too have occasionally used in the past. However, the expression is misleading, as it seems to imply that the so-called deterrent may be actually used in certain circumstances. So far as India is concerned, we are totally opposed to the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances. I believe that this is also the position of many other countries -- in fact of the majority of the Members of the United Nations. Our own emphasis has always been on an early and large-scale reduction as a step leading to total elimination. The idea that limited stocks retained for a temporary period, as the price we are paying for an agreement on disarmament, may be actually used in some given circumstances is one which we ourselves cannot support.

Those are some of the considerations which have guided us in our approach to the question of establishing a working group.

We have welcomed the changes in the Soviet position on nuclear delivery vehicles, not because we consider the retention of limited stocks as a progressive step in itself, but because an agreement on this question might open the way to a larger agreement. The latest change in the Soviet position took place during our present session, when the Western proposal for a working group was accepted in principle by the Soviet side. A working group is, of course, necessary, since matters of detail in regard to the reduction and elimination of vehicles must be examined by experts. However, the working group must also have a clear directive and clear terms of reference. On that question there is a continued lack of agreement between the two sides. With regard to methods of reduction, the Western view is that all proposals should be examined by the working group. The Soviet proposal is that the so-called "nuclear umbrella" should first be accepted in principle. That would apparently rule out any consideration of the method of reduction proposed by the Western side.

There seems to be some difference of opinion also on the purpose of the inquiry. The Western proposal does not define the purpose in clear terms. The Soviet view is that the group should be instructed to examine details of the so-called "umbrella" -- that is, the actual composition of the limited stocks to be retained by each side and other matters of detail relating to the level to which stocks would be reduced.

I should like to state the Indian delegation's views on the methods of reduction and the purpose of the inquiry. We agree in principle that the hands of the working group should not be tied. It should be open to the group to consider all proposals, whether we agree with them or not. Our own view, however, is that small percentage cuts spread out over a number of years would not solve the problem. Uniform percentage

(Mr. Nehru, India)

cuts when one side is weaker than the other might also create a dangerous imbalance. At a time when existing stocks of dangerous weapons are expanding so rapidly a substantial reduction is needed at an early stage.

Long before Mr. Gromyko presented his proposal, the late Prime Minister of India defined our approach to the problem in a speech in Parliament. Speaking on 19 March 1962, the late Prime Minister Nehru said:

"Now, even if you start with this idea of agreement on this complete and wholesale disarmament, naturally it does not appear overnight: you have to do it by phases. Then the difficulty comes as to what should be the first phase, what should be the second. Thereafter it was agreed that in any phase or any step that was taken, nothing should be done that made one Great Power weaker than the other rival Power, that is, the relative proportion of strength should be maintained in partial disarmament etc. That is also agreed to, but however much it may be phased, it seems to me that the first phase must be a substantial one, must be a striking one, must be such as to strike the imagination of the world. There is no good saying: all right, let us reduce our arms by ten per cent or five per cent. That will not affect anybody, it will be a joking matter. So, while it has to be phased, the first phase has to be a striking one." (Lok Sabha Debates, second series, Vol.LXI, No.6, cols. 1012, 1013)

Now, if a substantial reduction is to be carried out at an early stage -- and in our view that is the correct approach to the problem --, then a clear directive must be given to the working group; otherwise the inquiry by the group will follow the same general course as the discussions in our Committee. The purpose of the inquiry must be clearly defined. so that the group may evolve some concrete solution, or alternative solutions, for the consideration of the Committee. In our view, that is how the group should function, and its attention should be directed to the precise problem to be solved. The problem is how to reduce and eliminate the nuclear menace at the earliest possible date.

Not only our Eastern colleagues but all of us, including our Western colleagues, have referred to this problem. I recall the statement made by the United States representative, Mr. Timberlake, some weeks ago. Although his proposals were not the same as ours, he agreed that the nuclear menace was the most pressing problem facing the world (ENDC/PV.207, p.18). In our view this pressing problem, to which an early solution has to be found, should form the basis of the terms of reference. The inquiry by the group must of course take place on the basis of the Joint Statement of Agreed

(Mr. Nehru, India)

Principles (ENDC/5): All our negotiations and discussions take place on that basis. Thus balance, verification and so on in relation to the reduction of vehicles must also be considered by the working group. However, the essential purpose of the inquiry and the precise problem which we should like the working group to help us in solving -- namely, the elimination of the nuclear menace -- must, in our view, be kept in mind in framing the terms of reference.

We made some tentative suggestions on the question of the terms of reference on 30 June (ENDC/PV.194, p.12). We should like today to make some further suggestions, in the light of certain considerations which seem to us important.

First, while we value very much the interesting suggestions made by our Swedish colleague (ENDC/PV.210, pp.33 et seq.), it seems to us that a direct approach to the question of the reduction of existing stocks of nuclear delivery vehicles -- as has also been suggested by some other representatives of non-aligned countries -- is in every way more desirable. An indirect approach, based on an investigation of the requirements of the last stage of disarmament, would involve delay, and none of the difficulties which we are experiencing at present would be removed.

Secondly, the idea of a nuclear deterrent -- or "shield", or "umbrella" -- which seems to imply that limited stocks of nuclear delivery vehicles might be retained for actual use in some given circumstances, is an idea which we ourselves cannot support. Nor is that idea consistent with some of the resolutions on this subject which have been adopted by the General Assembly. Therefore we should prefer to avoid the use of such an expression, which, apart from its other implications, has led to some controversy in our Committee. We think that a factual statement defining the level to which existing stocks should be reduced would be much better.

Thirdly, while we agree that all proposals for the reduction and elimination of existing stocks should be considered, in our view a substantial reduction at an early stage will be necessary if we are to make some real progress towards disarmament and the elimination of the nuclear menace.

The United States representative, Mr. Timberlake, has suggested that the working group might be instructed to consider proposals for the reduction of stocks to an agreed level in each stage. "Agreed level" is a factual statement, but it does not bring out the necessity of a substantial reduction at an early stage. Therefore we should like to suggest that the terms of reference might be drafted somewhat as follows:

(Mr. Nehru, India)

"A working group shall be established to consider proposals for the reduction of existing stocks of nuclear delivery vehicles to the lowest agreed levels at an early stage of the disarmament process, leading to the total elimination and destruction of all stocks."

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): At the meeting of the Committee held on 25 August the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, rightly observed that -

"... we must face the situation that, as our negotiations have developed, the problem of nuclear delivery vehicles has become the very key to our deliberations on general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.210, p.32)

That observation is true. But it also emphasizes another and no less important truth: that the cardinal, key problem which has been before us since the very beginning of the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee is the problem of eliminating the danger of a thermonuclear war or, more precisely, the question of the importance and place of this problem within the framework of a programme of general and complete disarmament.

Just as life itself and the entirely new situation due to the appearance and improvement of weapons of mass destruction that were unknown in the recent past have compelled us to seek a new approach to the solution of the problem of disarmament in general, so, in particular, we have had to seek the most effective approach, the most reliable way that would lead to the elimination of the danger of a thermonuclear catastrophe within the framework of any programme of general and complete disarmament worthy of the name. Therefore it is quite natural and legitimate that the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles has taken on the character of a key problem for our work.

It is precisely in this key question, the solution of which, it is generally admitted, can alone open the way to rapid progress in the disarmament negotiations, that we are compelled, unfortunately, to note the lack of any results whatsoever after almost seven months of discussions. Obviously, the time at our disposal before submitting the results of our work to the nineteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly will hardly be sufficient to enable us to find a way out of the impasse in the matter of accomplishing the main task entrusted to us by the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly: the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Unfortunately, we have once again to take a look back, not in order to trace with a feeling of relief and satisfaction the path we have traversed towards solving what is generally acknowledged to be the most urgent and important problem of our times, but in

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

order to seek once again for the reasons for our failure. It is necessary not only to discover the reasons for the impasse, but also to point them out quite frankly. It is quite obvious that the true reasons are neither superficial nor procedural, that they are not determined by the impossibility of finding the best possible formulation of the terms of reference for a working group, but lie in something more serious and, of course, in something much more substantive.

As you have already seen from the analysis of our discussions during the recent period, all efforts to find a mutually-acceptable basis for the activities of the working group have been fruitless precisely because no formula can, let alone should, cover up the existing basic and evidently profound differences in the approach to the problem of general and complete disarmament in general and, in particular, in the approach to the problem of eliminating the menace of thermonuclear war during the process of general and complete disarmament.

In this regard the Bulgarian delegation fully associates itself with the observations and conclusions put forward by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, at our 210th meeting. The detailed and thorough analysis made by the Soviet delegation has revealed the real reasons underlying the failure of the negotiations on general and complete disarmament since March 1962 until the present day.

It is common knowledge that in order to cure any serious disease it is essential to carry out an accurate and correct analysis. It is difficult to fight against an unknown evil. To discover and point out the real reasons for the failure of our negotiations on general and complete disarmament is therefore of very great and fundamental importance for the future of these negotiations. That is why the delegations of the socialist countries, in seeking and pointing out those reasons, are guided exclusively by concern to improve the prospects of our negotiations.

It is obvious that the observations and conclusions put forward by the Soviet delegation on 25 August cannot be refuted; they are being confirmed from day to day. Our discussions on the question of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, and in particular on the question of a "nuclear umbrella", show that the differences which have once again blocked the negotiations lie in "a clash between two basically-different approaches to disarmament" (ENDC/PV.210, p.15).

For almost fifteen years since the end of the Second World War, disarmament negotiations have been going on at various levels and in various bodies. Everyone knows that they have yielded no results. The basic, main reason for the failure of the negotiations has been that the solution of the problem of disarmament has been sought in

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

a "balanced reduction" and "regulation" of armaments and armed forces -- that is, so to say, in a kind of "freeze" of the existing state of affairs or, at best, at a certain "lower level". That approach has been based on the thesis or "doctrine" of a "balance of armaments", a doctrine which the Western Powers have used to cover up their lack of a real intention to set about disarming, their desire to maintain a monopoly of nuclear weapons -- that is, in fact, their striving for "superiority" in armaments. It is not surprising that such concepts have resulted in an unprecedented arms race and have faced humanity with the following alternative: either real general and complete disarmament, or a thermonuclear catastrophe.

The historic resolution (A/RES/1378(XIV)) adopted at the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly was a clear expression of the determination of the peoples not only to put an end to the arms race but, above all, to put the disarmament negotiations on a new and sound basis -- that is, a basis that would exclude "partial" solutions of the disarmament problem and would exclude the concept of the "regulation" of armaments and armed forces -- concepts which have proved utterly useless for overcoming the state of deadlock in the disarmament negotiations.

Everyone knows that the negotiations in the Ten-Nation Committee came up against insuperable obstacles precisely because, in interpreting the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on general and complete disarmament, the countries members of NATO recognized in words the necessity of achieving the "final goal" -- that is, general and complete disarmament -- but in fact opposed any "over-all solution" of this problem. The only approach which the Western Powers considered possible and "realistic" was the approach of a "gradual", "progressive" achievement of the "final goal" that is, through the implementation of separate, "partial", "specific", "initial" measures, which would lead consecutively and ultimately "towards" general and complete disarmament.

Here, for instance, is what was stated on 5 April 1960 on behalf of five Western Powers by the representative of one of them:

"It does not say that general and complete disarmament must be worked out immediately. We know that is impossible. It speaks of working out 'measures leading towards ... the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control'." (ENDC/PV.16, p.34)

Trying to justify the refusal of the five States members of NATO to accept as a task of the Eighteen-Nation Committee the working out of an over-all programme of general and complete disarmament, the same Western representative stated on that occasion:

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

"We cannot accept the drastic conclusions in the Soviet plan. Neither can we do away with all military organizations, because the United Nations Charter imposes upon us obligations which we cannot disavow without violating the Charter."

(ibid., p.24)

In other words, the arguments of the Western Powers were based on the same concept of ensuring security, not through the implementation of real and effective disarmament measures and, in the last analysis, through disarmament itself, but through the accomplishment of some sort of "regulation" of armaments on the basis of the implementation of separate, partial measures aimed in the main at maintaining the existing state of affairs. The result of the application of this concept in the negotiations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee has been a further waste of valuable time and a further intensification of the arms race.

If we go over the main stages of our negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee we cannot fail to notice that, underlying the theses sustained by the Western Powers in regard to key issues of the problem of general and complete disarmament, there are plainly visible in one form or another the same concepts and the same "philosophy" -- save the mark! -- adapted to the new conditions. The justification of these concepts again takes the line of an "interpretation" of texts; but this time not of the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly but of the Agreed Principles and, in particular, the fifth principle of the Joint Statement of 20 September 1961 (ENDC/5).

The representative of the United Kingdom has helped us to understand, and indeed very clearly, what the essence of this peculiar interpretation consists in. All, or nearly all, the arguments adduced by Mr. Thomas on 25 August to justify the refusal of the Western Powers to accept the principle, the idea itself of a "nuclear umbrella" essentially reflect the same fallacious concept, the same unsuitable approach to the problem of disarmament: the approach of seeking for security now and during the whole process of disarmament, not in disarmament itself, but in a "balance of armaments" and above all, of course, in nuclear missile armaments. Mr. Thomas stated:

"... it is still unclear why the Soviet Government should wish to run the risk of upsetting in this way the stability of the balance of nuclear deterrent power on which peace and security will largely depend during the disarmament process."

(ENDC/PV.210, p.8)

It seems to us that in this question posed by the United Kingdom representative there is contained in the most concise form the basic, substantive difference in approach,

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

not only to the idea of a "nuclear umbrella", but also to the idea of general and complete disarmament as a whole. In fact, it is difficult to expect substantial results in the disarmament negotiations so long as the Western Powers continue to be guided by the idea that peace and security depend and will depend - throughout the disarmament process - on "the stability of the balance of nuclear deterrent power". So long as the Western Powers adhere to this idea, which is suggested to us as the only "realistic" one, we cannot expect the results of our negotiations on general and complete disarmament to be any more encouraging than they have been so far.

The essence of the "nuclear umbrella" idea, which was taken up and given concrete shape by the Soviet Union, consisted and consists precisely in establishing an additional guarantee in case of a possible violation of the treaty on general and complete disarmament during the process of its implementation. But the principal guarantee of peace and security, which at the same time is the only real guarantee, is disarmament itself -- that is, the implementation of effective and radical disarmament measures and, of course, at the first stage of the disarmament process. I venture to point out that we find confirmation of these views also in the very interesting statement made today by the leader of the delegation of India.

The representative of the United Kingdom repeated all the arguments which we have already had occasion to hear at the time of our initial general debates -- for instance, when discussing the preamble, or the provisions on the "general obligations", of a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. I do not wish today to dwell on the question of the extent to which there is no foundation for the arguments concerning so-called "geographical factors", the "numerical superiority" of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty in the field of conventional arms and armed forces, the "compactness" of the Soviet armed forces, their "facility of movement", and so forth.

In this regard the delegations of the socialist countries have on many occasions been able to show the artificial, far-fetched nature of those arguments both separately and as a whole. Refutation of those arguments, as is well known, can be found also in the statements made by many of the most responsible spokesmen of the Western countries. What I should like to emphasize today, and what seems to me to be especially characteristic in the statement made by the United Kingdom representative at the 210th meeting, is -- I venture to say -- the emphasis on military staff language, a military staff way of thinking, military staff "categories", which flawlessly reflect the philosophy of the Western Powers in disarmament problems and which determine their fears of "overloading" the initial stages of disarmament.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

The artificial dramatizing of the "defenceless" situation in which the Western European Powers -- the NATO allies of the United States -- would find themselves has nothing to do with the real situation which would come about as a result of carrying out the measures provided for in the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1). That, undoubtedly, is more than obvious, and to our Western colleagues in the first place. Indeed, general insecurity, mistrust and suspicion, the danger of conflicts and military clashes, characterize precisely the present international situation, including the situation in Europe. This situation would continue to exist in practice right up to the last stage of general and complete disarmament, if the "Outline" submitted by the United States were to be taken as the basis of disarmament.

As is evident from Mr. Thomas's statement, our Western colleagues cannot imagine disarmament without military blocs and alliances, without military bases in the territories of other countries, without constant and large-scale "joint" military manoeuvres, or without "invulnerable" and, of course, large land and sea nuclear forces -- in short, disarmament without complete combat readiness and continuous military preparations. The persistence with which the Western Powers have recently been trying to convince us of the advantages of the measure for a so-called "freeze" of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is obviously not altogether alien to such a conception of disarmament. In fact, if we start from the premise that it is first necessary to establish a "higher degree of confidence" through the retention of those armaments which, according to Mr. Thomas, States "consider to be their main means of security" (ENDC/PV.210, p.9), we shall certainly never be able to imagine disarmament otherwise than as a "freezing" of the present more or less "stable balance" together with the establishment of appropriate international control -- that is, control without real disarmament.

The application of such an approach and its logical extension to all stages of general and complete disarmament -- that is, until the end of the disarmament process -- would merely be the negation of the idea of general and complete disarmament, the negation of any disarmament at all. No matter how our Western colleagues try to justify this by talking about "realism", such an approach is nothing but an attempt to substitute for the idea of general and complete disarmament -- that is, the elimination of the material means of warfare, and in the first place nuclear weapons and their means of delivery -- "the idea of retaining nuclear weapons as a factor in international relations" (ibid., p.25).

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

In this regard a particularly characteristic example, which illustrates the attitude of the Western Powers towards disarmament problems as a whole and towards the problem of nuclear disarmament in particular, is, I would say, their making a "fetish" of the role of nuclear weapons as a factor in international relations. I refer to the position of the Western Powers and the United States of America in particular on the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. At a time when everyone recognizes that urgent and effective measures must be taken to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, at a time when everyone -- including the most responsible political leaders of the West -- recognize that a widening of the circle of States which would be given control over nuclear weapons could have disastrous consequences for the cause of peace and disarmament, at this very time steps are being taken which are completely contrary to the warnings of international public opinion.

Here again, underlying the arguments with which the Western Powers attempt to justify these actions is the "concern" to safeguard security by "balancing" the nuclear power of the two military and political groupings. Yet it is well known that the cause of the mistrust and tension in Europe -- and not only in Europe -- lies in the establishment of numerous United States military bases on the territories of other countries -- that is, in the dissemination of nuclear weapons in all parts of the world. It is also well known that the majority of the European allies of the United States in NATO have made it quite clear that they do not need the additional security which has been offered to them through the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force. There can be no doubt that the implementation of the plan to create a multilateral nuclear force would have dangerous consequences for the security of all and could only lead to a further, even more intensified nuclear arms race.

In explaining why the Gromyko proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) is unacceptable to the West, the representatives of the Western Powers use the same arguments, which, when analyzed, show quite clearly that they consider unacceptable the very concept of a "nuclear umbrella", any concept whatsoever of a "minimum deterrent" -- that is, in practice, the concept according to which the essence, the core of a programme of general and complete disarmament is the elimination of the threat of nuclear war at the very beginning of the disarmament process, the concept according to which the guarantee of peace and security consists in eliminating that threat as soon as possible and not in maintaining it as long as possible.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

In other words, what is unacceptable to the Western Powers is not only "the Soviet version of the nuclear umbrella concept" but, quite obviously, any version of that concept. In this regard the statement made by Mr. Thomas at the 210th meeting was noteworthy because it dispelled any lack of clarity in regard to the real reasons preventing the achievement of a mutually-acceptable and agreed basis for the terms of reference of the working group. Whether he wished to do so or not, the United Kingdom representative rendered more remote the possibility of reaching agreement on this question at the present time, and thus showed how untimely would be the establishment of a working group in the absence of an agreement in principle on the basis of its activities.

The representative of Sweden has reminded us that ---

"In October 1963, when welcoming the Gromyko proposal as a promising compromise" --- and I stress the word "compromise", not the imposition of one's own plan --- "the Swedish delegation in the United Nations expressed the view that a consequence might be that the whole approach to the disarmament plans would have to be overhauled ..." (ENDC/PV.210, p.30)

Obviously the Western Powers are not prepared to overhaul the whole approach to the disarmament problem, and continue to consider that any compromise which does not include completely the approach laid down in the United States plan (ENDC/30) of 18 April 1962 is unacceptable to them.

In the light of these facts, we must repeat that the claims of some of our Western colleagues about the "flexible attitude" of the West, as well as the insinuations about a "step backwards" having been taken by the Soviet Union in connexion with the terms of reference of the working group, sound extremely unconvincing. It is an indisputable fact that the Western Powers are still not prepared to take a single step forward on any of the key problems of general and complete disarmament. And as the representative of the Soviet Union has pointed out, there is only one reason for this: the Western Powers are still unable "to discard the fallacious doctrine of maintaining the 'balance of armaments' as the basis of their policy in the field of disarmament." (ibid., p.27)

The representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, referred once again to the fifth principle of the Joint Statement in order to defend the position of the Western Powers. But we consider that the ideas expressed by Mr. Burns in another forum, but on the same basic, fundamental question, are definitely more in keeping with the spirit and letter of the fifth principle. With Mr. Burns' permission, I shall quote what he said at a public meeting devoted to disarmament problems held in Copenhagen on 9 May 1963. Mr. Burns said that everyone remembered the Roman proverb "Si vis pacem, para bellum". States

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

had followed that policy for many centuries. Unfortunately that proverb had proved in the end to be erroneous, for when preparations are made for war, war is bound to follow. If we wished to reach an agreement on general and complete disarmament, then that policy, which States had followed for a long time and which had involved the nations in war, would have to be discarded. That is what Mr. Burns said a year ago.

I am sure that the representative of Canada will not take upon himself the thankless task of proving now that the fifth principle of disarmament means equal security by means of the arms race and not in the conditions of the implementation of disarmament. Nor do I doubt that Mr. Burns will not try to prove to us that, in unanimously approving the Principles, the United Nations General Assembly had in mind such an equilibrium through armaments and not through disarmament.

I should like to hope that Mr. Burns will agree that questions of the basic trend of the policy of States could not be resolved successfully within the framework of a working group. The results of a discussion by experts who would be instructed, as Mr. Burns suggests, to determine which proposal corresponded to the principle of "equal" security for all States would be exceedingly dubious. The usefulness of such activities would be dubious so long as the policy of one of the parties concerned in the field of disarmament is based on the thesis of a "balance of armaments" behind which is concealed a desire to ensure a more or less illusory "superiority" in one or another field of disarmament.

We know that to renounce such a line in their policies and, accordingly, such concepts in regard to the problem of disarmament is very difficult, especially for States which are systematically carrying out the policy of militarizing their national economies. But it is necessary to do so, if we really wish to do away with the obstacles hampering the disarmament negotiations and if all the countries concerned are guided by the interests of peace and security for the peoples, including their own.

"What kind of peace do I mean and what kind of peace do we seek?" That was the question put by the late President of the United States, John Kennedy, to his audience on 10 June 1963. The reply which the President gave deserves to be recalled, and here it is:

"Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war ... I am talking about genuine peace ... not merely peace for Americans but peace for all men and women -- not merely peace in our time but peace in all time." (ENDC/95)

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

That is what the late President Kennedy said. When the policy of the United States of America and its Western allies is really guided by the desire to ensure peace for all men and women, now and for all time, then the atmosphere in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will be altogether changed. The non-aligned countries, as is evident from their statements in the United Nations, in our Committee and in their own countries, will welcome such a change in the Western positions in favour of real disarmament. The socialist countries will likewise do so, and then a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control will be put before mankind with all speed.

Mr. TIMBERLAKE (United States of America): Yesterday the Third International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy opened in Geneva. It seems appropriate in this Committee to mark this occasion, which brings to Geneva almost five thousand representatives from the world-wide nuclear community. Their interest and their efforts complement ours. We have directed much of our energy towards putting an end to the nuclear arms race, and first steps have been taken in that direction. I refer, of course, to the limited test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) and the announcements concerning cut-backs by the United States and the Soviet Union in the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons (ENDC/131,132).

Our colleagues attending the Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy are seeking new and greater uses by which the energy of the atom can be harnessed for the greater good of all mankind. Their efforts to date have brought the use of nuclear power from infancy to adulthood. It is our hope that these two parallel efforts will continue. With determination and with a spirit of co-operation in both fields, we can build a better society for all. As President Johnson said in his message to the Atomic Energy Conference: "Today, at last, we have good reason for belief that the atom can be made the servant, not the scourge, of mankind" (A/CONF.28/STA/11).

I should like now to turn to the matter before us today. We have been involved almost the entire summer in a quest for an agreed basis for a working group on nuclear delivery vehicles. My delegation and certain other delegations have devoted considerable effort to the attempt to find a formulation which would be acceptable to both sides. We have done so because we were encouraged by Mr. Zorin's original proposal for the creation of such a group (ENDC/PV.188, p.17). Yet, despite our hopes for progress, no progress has yet been made. This morning I should like briefly to review the history of our recent discussions, to show why we have been unable to move ahead, and to consider the status of this problem as it now appears.

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

Our discussion on the subject of nuclear delivery vehicles during the first part of this year did not advance us further towards a solution of this important problem. One of the reasons for that was the refusal of the Soviet Union to respond in a meaningful way to the views expressed regarding the Soviet position. Another was the Soviet Union's refusal to fill in some of the more important blanks in this position. As far as we were concerned, we were willing to investigate the specifics, and particularly the thinking that lay behind the specifics, of the Soviet plan (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1), even though there was no doubt in anyone's mind about our objections to many central features. We expected the same from the Soviet Union, for only if proper consideration is given to the views of both sides can progress be made.

As the Committee is well aware, important differences in approach remain to be resolved, between the Soviet Union and the West, with respect to the problem of reducing and eliminating nuclear delivery vehicles. That was true in our discussions last year, and it remains true. Our objective is a programme that will reduce the threat of nuclear war -- or indeed any kind of war -- as far as possible, as quickly as possible, and in a manner that does not threaten international security. The Soviet approach, as it has been presented to us, does not meet that criterion, for it would result in a massive weakening of the Western defence position, and hence would not preserve the balance upon which international security depends.

The Western plan, on the other hand, does provide a balanced, orderly approach to the elimination of the nuclear threat, and would therefore be far more likely to achieve our objective. It is not sufficient to say, as the Soviet representative has said, that an acceptable plan must eliminate the threat of nuclear war in the first stage of disarmament. That is a slogan, and, as is the case with all slogans, its pleasant sound is not necessarily a measure of its validity. Unbalanced disarmament can have calamitous results, as history proves. If there are specific objections to the method of reduction proposed by the West -- and perhaps I should repeat "specific objections" -- we are prepared to consider them. We do not expect that any plan eventually agreed to will be unchanged from its original draft. But let us not merely toss slogans around; let us bring a few more facts into our discussions.

Mr. Zorin's proposal to create a working group was the first sign that the Soviet delegation might be prepared for serious discussion of the question of nuclear delivery vehicles. It was a glimmer of a promise that progress might begin; that more detailed and specific discussion in a working group, with the participation, as necessary, of experts, could prove fruitful. It certainly held the promise of narrowing the areas of difference and facilitating mutual understanding of some of the exceedingly complicated issues involved in the reduction of these weapons.

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

From the outset, however, we emphasized that the group must be free to consider all relevant proposals on nuclear delivery vehicles. It would have to examine the practical and technical issues which would need to be resolved, and consider how the various proposals could contribute to resolving them, before we could find an agreed method of reduction.

The development of the Soviet Union's attitude towards its own suggestion since this was made last June has been particularly disappointing to us in the light of our earlier hopes. It has become increasingly clear to this Committee, as the representative of the United Kingdom pointed out last week (ENDC/PV.210, p.5), that the Soviet delegation has taken several steps backward since Mr. Zorin made his proposal.

Let us recall briefly the development of our discussions on a working group. We in the West welcomed Mr. Zorin's proposal, as I have said, although it is true that he urged us at the same time to approve the principle of the "nuclear umbrella". There seemed to be enough flexibility in his words to allow agreement on terms of reference. We were given to understand that the working group would be able to study the quantities of nuclear delivery vehicles to be retained throughout the process of disarmament, as well as other matters relating to the reduction of those weapons. Having in mind the Soviet Union's recognition of the need to retain nuclear delivery vehicles throughout the disarmament process, the United States delegation sought, in a series of co-Chairmen's meetings, to find with the Soviet delegation an agreed basis for a working group.

We started with the understanding that the terms of reference should be as specific as possible and yet should reflect the present actual state of our negotiations. My delegation eventually suggested to this Committee a formulation which reflected the objectives of the Conference and the degree of agreement already attained on the subject before us, allowing discussion of all proposals relevant to this framework. Subsequently we suggested a rephrasing of the terms of reference, hoping that it would facilitate agreement.

Let us consider whether the Soviet Union matched this reasonable attitude. Only a few weeks after Mr. Zorin's statements indicating the Soviet desire to agree on a working group and some flexibility in the Soviet position, Mr. Tsarapkin began to clarify that position. First, we discovered that the principle of the "nuclear umbrella" when used by the Soviet delegation was identical with the Soviet position on nuclear vehicles (ENDC/PV.200, p.23). Then we were told flatly that a working group could consider no proposal other than that of Mr. Gromyko, and that such consideration would have to be preceded by acceptance of the Soviet position (ibid., p.27).

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

Several members of our Committee then bent their energies to helping us out of our impasse, as the representative of India reminded us this morning. They showed themselves to be as anxious as we are to see a working group created. We indicated clearly where we agreed and where we disagreed with their points of view. We valued their suggestions, studied them with care, and endeavoured to reflect their viewpoint in our own formulations.

The Soviet representative at first made some effort to appear receptive to the contributions of the various delegations, even when indicating where their formulations were unsatisfactory to his delegation. But then, to emphasize the firm determination of the Soviet delegation not to compromise at all, an addition was inserted in the record of the meeting of 4 August (ENDC/PV.204, p.10) reaffirming acceptance of the "nuclear umbrella" principle as spelt out in Mr. Gromyko's statement as a precondition for a working group. Again, only the Soviet position could be the basis for discussion.

Last week the Soviet delegation went back one step further. Specifically, the Soviet representative said the time was not ripe for the establishment of a working group (ENDC/PV.210, p.28). We regret also that the discouraging intransigence expressed in the Soviet statement of 25 August appears to exclude useful exploration of the interesting initiative of the Swedish delegation (ibid.).

Thus we seem to have come full circle. Originally the Soviet delegation pressed for acceptance of its position on nuclear vehicles, without giving any details about it other than the original words of the suggestion made by Mr. Gromyko. We were told earlier this year that it was a concrete plan and that it had been explained sufficiently to allow decisions by the Western Powers. We were also told that it was a compromise, when in actual fact it reflects only a growth in the realism of the Soviet Union's approach to the problem. At this session we have been told that it is not a specific plan but a principle only; and that this principle must be the sole basis for the proposed working group and must be accepted before the working group is established. These facts lead logically to the conclusion that the Soviet proposal for a working group was advanced solely as a new device to secure approval of the Soviet approach on the basis of a procedural decision rather than on the basis of substantive negotiation.

On the other hand, perhaps the original Soviet proposal for a working group was sincere. Perhaps the Soviet Union subsequently became reluctant to subject its position to close scrutiny in a working group and to give such specifics as there might be for consideration. But, if this is the case, we fail to understand why the shift in attitude occurred. The Soviet Union must realize that an exchange of specific

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

information is required for serious deliberations and for the development of the mutual confidence necessary for agreements on disarmament. Such an exchange can be useful even when undertaken from differing or even widely-varying viewpoints, because the development of hard facts can assist in reaching intelligent decisions and in modifying preconceptions.

Agreement on a working group should have been a simple matter if our objectives were the same. My delegation has pointed out that it is primarily a procedural issue; but the fact remains that agreement on this issue still eludes us, largely because of Soviet insistence on fusing it with the substantive issues involved. We have already stated that the working group could consider the Soviet proposal on a priority basis, thus ensuring due attention to it (ENDC/PV.200, p.16). Hence we cannot understand the basis for the continuing rigidity of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, we must not lose patience. We must continue to work for agreement which will make further progress in this important area possible.

Since Mr. Zorin's original statement on 9 June (ENDC/PV.188, p.17), the Western and a number of other members of this Committee have made every effort to use his suggestion as an aid to progress in our negotiations. That we have not yet succeeded in our efforts is a disappointment to us all. We must continue to hope that time will bring change and that the change will reflect a willingness by the Soviet delegation to consider the views of all parties to the negotiations. Surely our common interest in making progress in our negotiations demands that we succeed in our task.

Mr. TAHOURDIN (United Kingdom): At our 210th meeting last Tuesday the leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Mr. Thomas, spoke at some length on the question we are considering again this morning. Therefore, I would not have requested the floor today if it were not that the very interesting speech of the Swedish representative was delivered only after Mr. Thomas had spoken. Therefore I just want to say now, very briefly, that we in the United Kingdom delegation welcome the initiatives taken by Mrs. Myrdal both last Tuesday and five weeks ago (ENDC/PV.202, pp.5 et seq.). If I may say so, we are grateful to her for her thoughtful and constructive efforts to suggest a basis on which the Committee could agree to set up a working group on nuclear delivery vehicles.

As the Committee may recall, Sir Paul Mason stated at that meeting (ibid., p.14) that we agreed with a great deal of what Mrs. Myrdal had submitted to the Committee on that occasion. We have now studied the verbatim record of Mrs. Myrdal's statement of

(Mr. Tahourdin, United Kingdom)

last Tuesday (ENDC/PV.210, pp.29 et seq.). Like Mrs. Myrdal, we too should very much prefer to see what she called a major working group established by the Committee, if possible, before the end of the present session. However, if that proves impossible, then we should certainly explore the possibility of establishing a preliminary working group. In fact, given the magnitude of the problem, there may be considerable merit in her suggestion (ibid., p.33) that we should, as it were, take two bites at the cherry.

As I understood Mrs. Myrdal's suggestion, a preliminary working group might be charged with the task of examining the best ways of tackling this complicated problem of nuclear delivery vehicles. I trust, therefore, that the Committee as a whole, the co-Chairmen, and the Soviet representative in particular, will give serious thought to Mrs. Myrdal's suggestions, in the hope that these will in fact help us to move forward along the road which sooner or later we shall all have to take. Meanwhile we have heard today an interesting statement by another of the non-aligned representatives, the representative of India. I should like to add that we shall of course also study very carefully what he has said.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): Before I begin my prepared statement, I should like to say a word about the remarks which the representative of Bulgaria made in his statement today (Supra, pp. 13 et seq.) in regard to what I had said (ENDC/PV.210, pp.36,37) about the fifth principle of the Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5) and what I said at the meeting of the World Veterans' Federation in Copenhagen last year. I cannot see that there is any discrepancy between those two statements. What I said in Copenhagen was arguing that disarmament, not armament, was necessary if we were to have peace; and what I said in regard to the fifth principle was the same thing. That is a principle for the negotiation of disarmament, and it seemed necessary to remind the representatives from Eastern Europe of that particular principle because they seemed to have a chronic aversion to the principle of balance, or, perhaps I should say, to the word "balance". I would reserve the right to say something further on this point at a later meeting; and, with your permission, I shall now proceed to give the statement which I have prepared.

At the meeting of 28 July the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, included in her very important statement some thought-provoking remarks on peace-keeping forces. The main subject of her address was, as we have been reminded this morning, the terms of reference for a working group on the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles. But she also said:

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

"During earlier meetings several speakers have stressed that the setting up of the working party should not bring to a halt the deliberations on general and complete disarmament within the Committee itself. The Swedish delegation wishes to suggest that the Committee should place on its agenda, as a 'natural second', the question of the establishment of the international peace-keeping force."

(ENDC/PV.202, p.13)

The Canadian delegation welcomes that suggestion. As we cannot find anything useful to say today to break the deadlock in which the Committee now finds itself over the terms of reference for the working group, we propose to take advantage of the rule of procedure which allows a delegation to speak on any subject it deems important. We shall give a few of our preliminary views, therefore, on the subject of international peace-keeping. We believe that this is an aspect of disarmament which is attracting increased attention. Doubtless other representatives have received, as I have, a letter from the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, from which I should like to quote two paragraphs, as follows:

"It is the opinion of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom ... that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is giving insufficient attention to what may be a major obstacle to achieving a world disarmament agreement, namely, the fears of nations that they will have no reliable means of protecting their vital interests in a warless world where they can no longer rely on their military power for this purpose.

"An agreement by the nations to give up their military power would be a step unprecedented in human history and the nations must be enabled, in advance, to envisage acceptable and reliable means for resolving their disputes before they will dare undertake genuine and far-reaching disarmament. Such problems as incursions across national boundaries, shipping arms across national boundaries, economic boycotts, etc., may be quite as devastating as war to a nation's vital interests. International peace-keeping forces can, at best, intervene in crises. But it is of the utmost importance that there be just and effective means also of dealing with the disputes which create the crises."

I should like now to quote paragraph 7 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, which reads:

"Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

and complete disarmament; there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations." (ENDC/5, p.3)

I think that is one of the most important principles agreed as a basis for the development of disarmament negotiations. But where it says, "Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures ...", and so on, the Canadian delegation would be inclined to substitute a stronger statement somewhat on these lines:

"Unless institutions for peace-keeping are strengthened and made more effective, progress to the later stages of disarmament will not be possible."

We think that the reasons for this are obvious. Nations will not give up finally the security, however precarious, which their existing armed forces now ensure to them, unless they are convinced that their vital interests will be protected under a system of international law and that their security from aggression or threat of it will be guaranteed by an effective international peace-keeping force.

In accordance with the Agreed Principle I have cited, both the United States and the Soviet Union have included in their drafts for a disarmament treaty sections which outline certain measures to maintain international peace and security.

In its draft treaty (ENDC/2/Rev.1), the Soviet Union has set out measures for the first stage in article 18. That article and articles 27 and 37 can be summed up as providing that measures for international peace-keeping shall be undertaken strictly in accordance with the United Nations Charter. That, of course, requires that the permanent members of the Security Council shall agree unanimously on any peace-keeping action to be taken. As we all know, situations have occurred in which action has been considered necessary by a large majority of the Members of the United Nations, but lack of unanimity among the permanent members of the Council has prevented it. Canada believes that most Members of the United Nations are of the opinion that this Security Council unanimity requirement of the Charter lessens the possibilities of effective United Nations peace-keeping action.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

I said that the measures proposed by the Soviet Union in its draft treaty were in exact conformity with the Charter; but there is one exception, and that is the proposal for a troika command. This is found in article 37 (2), where it says that the command of the units referred to in the first paragraph of the article should be composed of representatives of the three principal groups of States existing in the world on the basis of equal representation. That seems to require some comment. While it is not questioned that all the political decisions on the employment of a peace-keeping force should be made by a political body -- say, an enlarged Security Council -- which would be properly representative of the entire membership of the United Nations, it is impossible for effective command of a military body to be exercised by a committee. Military history is full of examples of this, and I am sure the military advisers of all delegations could produce instances if asked to do so.

I should like now to quote from an article written by Mr. Paul Martin, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, in which he sets out the Canadian view of how peace-keeping should develop more or less in parallel with disarmament. He says:

"It seems clear, however, that as part of the process of moving towards the goal of general and complete disarmament we will have to refine and develop the peace-keeping role of the United Nations and equip it with the means of responding effectively to any emergencies, including those necessitating the employment of international security forces. In doing so, it is necessary to keep in mind the probable functions of United Nations peace forces in succeeding stages of disarmament.

"In the initial stages of disarmament, United Nations forces would probably continue to be raised on an ad hoc basis and would be composed of national contingents. However, as disarmament progresses, there would be considerable pressure for dealing with a wider range of disputes on a more systematic basis. New forms of peace-keeping activity could be expected to be developed in response to specific situations." (International Affairs, London: Vol.40, No.2 (April 1964), p.200)

I think that nearly all Members of the United Nations are fully conscious of the importance of developing improved and more effective measures of peace-keeping within the framework of the United Nations. The events of the past eight or ten years must have convinced everyone of this.

Now I shall revert again to what Mrs. Myrdal said at our meeting of 28 July. She said:

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

"I might even suggest that also on that item" -- the international peace-keeping force -- "we start from the far end -- from how we want that force to be shaped when it assumes the ultimate responsibility for world peace -- and thereafter outline the course we should have to take in order to reach that goal from where we now stand." (ENDC/PV.202, p.13)

The Canadian view on how we should approach the problem differs from that set out by the representative of Sweden -- and I say this with all respect. We should prefer what perhaps I may call the inductive method, in examining the problem of developing a United Nations force for keeping the peace in a disarmed world. That is to say, we should start from the facts of peace-keeping as they are in the world today. We should study the experience of United Nations peace-keeping, covering the years since the founding of the Organization, examine the defects and see how they might be eliminated; look at the successful elements and see how these could be developed to create a stronger and more flexible instrument for preserving peace.

It is true that we should have some conception of the final goal to be reached in this programme of development; but I doubt that any of us, or all of us reinforced by the wisdom of the governments which we represent, would be capable of envisaging in other than a very general way, the kind of peace-keeping force for a disarmed world that we all hope will one day come into being. The specifications for the eventual United Nations peace force which are set out both in the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on Disarmament (ENDC/30) and the Soviet draft disarmament treaty (ENDC/2/Rev.1) are rather general in their terms. Of course they embody somewhat different concepts, though I think both of them could be said to come within the Agreed Principle which I quoted at the beginning of my remarks. The Canadian delegation thinks that in this matter we are somewhat in the circumstances of explorers. We know where we are, but we have only a general idea of where we want to go and no very clear idea of what it will be like when we get there.

I should now like to quote from a speech of U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Harvard Alumni Association on 13 June 1963, giving his view of the difficulties that have to be overcome before there could be a "permanent" United Nations force -- and who should know these difficulties better than he? I will take the liberty of interpreting his adjective "permanent" in the sense of the kind of force which we can agree would be necessary as an institution of the United Nations capable of keeping the peace in a disarmed world. The Secretary-General said:

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

"We have to go further along the road of codification and acceptance of a workable body of international law. We have to develop a more sophisticated public opinion in the world, which can accept the transition from predominantly national thinking to international thinking.

"We shall have to develop a deeper faith in international institutions as such, and a greater confidence in the possibility of a United Nations civil service whose international loyalty and objectivity are generally accepted and above suspicion. We shall have to improve the method of financing international organization. Until these conditions are met, a permanent United Nations force may not be a practical proposition."

I doubt that anyone who looks objectively at the experience of the United Nations in peace-keeping up to date would disagree with what the Secretary-General had to say. To my mind, his conclusions would mean that the development of the form and function and political control and military command of an eventual peace-keeping force for a disarmed world must take place in a changing climate in respect of the basic attitudes towards the maintaining of international peace and security. This, in turn, would mean that it is not at present possible to define the form and function of the United Nations peace-keeping force for a disarmed world more precisely than they are now defined in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles and in the plans of the two sides.

But we do know fairly well where we stand now, and we should be able to discuss reasonably the next steps towards strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations in safeguarding peace and security. We should be able to agree upon and formulate the next step forward without too great a delay, and to put it into effect in the first stage of disarmament or even before. We should then be able to see what the ensuing step or stage in developing the United Nations peace-keeping powers ought to be, and eventually come to agreement about their final form and scope. In short, Canada sees the development of the United Nations peace-keeping powers to what will be needed in a disarmed world as an evolutionary process, rather than as an act of creation by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament somewhat in the style of the first chapter of Genesis.

I should like to quote section H, paragraph 4, of the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty, which reads as follows:

"The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support measures strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations so as to improve its capability to maintain international peace and security." (ENDC/30, p.18)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

That is what the parties are supposed to do in the first stage of disarmament, according to the programme which the Western countries propose. But I would suggest: why not before the first stage of disarmament? This is something which could be begun now and which, in a sense, would be a pre-disarmament or collateral measure.

The next paragraph of the United States draft reads as follows:

"The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to develop arrangements during Stage I for the establishment in Stage II of a United Nations Peace Force. To this end, the Parties to the Treaty would agree on the following measures within the United Nations:

- a. Examination of the experience of the United Nations leading to a further strengthening of United Nations forces for keeping the peace;
- b. Examination of the feasibility of concluding promptly the agreements envisaged in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter;
- c. Conclusion of an agreement for the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force in Stage II, including definitions of its purpose, mission, composition and strength, disposition, command and control, training, logistical support, financing, equipment and armaments." (*ibid.*)

What was suggested in sub-paragraphs a and b could certainly be undertaken now if all of us represented here could agree; and some preliminary discussions on the technical level could be begun with the aim of establishing the definitions referred to in paragraph c.

The question now arises whether the discussions of these subjects should be undertaken here, as part of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, or whether they should take place as a separate negotiation. The Canadian delegation does not take a definite stand in this matter. We should be interested to hear the opinions of other delegations. However, we are inclined to feel that this preliminary discussion should take place under United Nations auspices. If agreement were reached on what should be done, it probably could be put into effect without waiting for general disarmament to begin.

Most delegations here probably know that the Canadian Government has recently been trying to arrange a working-level meeting of experts from countries which have had actual peace-keeping experience. The purpose is to exchange views and pool ideas on the special military problems which have been met in the course of past peace-keeping operations. We have been holding preliminary discussions about such a meeting with other nations which, like Canada, have earmarked within their national establishments military units intended

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

for United Nations service if the United Nations should call for contingents for a peace-keeping force in future. We also have been consulting a number of other countries with peace-keeping experience which have not so far set up a stand-by force, in order to make the meeting representative of all geographic regions.

There has been some misunderstanding of our intention in this matter. In order to clear up one or two points, I shall quote from a speech made by Mr. Martin on 26 June. He said:

"In its approach to the practical problems of peace-keeping, Canada has no intention or desire to engage in the discussion of basic political and financial issues, which are properly subjects for discussion in the appropriate United Nations bodies. ...

"Nor are we engaging ourselves in the long-standing debate at the United Nations about the provisions of the Charter which refer to the establishment of United Nations military forces. Our approach is entirely practical and designed to ease the technical difficulties of United Nations Members which have, from time to time been required to provide military contingents at the request of the United Nations."

It is hoped to arrange this meeting for September or October this year, although preliminary consultations have been delayed because many of those concerned have been preoccupied with the peace-keeping situation in Cyprus. The Canadian delegation would be interested to hear, either at one of our future meetings or informally, the reactions of other delegations to these preliminary thoughts on the peace-keeping aspect of the disarmament plans with which we shall eventually have to deal.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

The Soviet delegation deems it necessary to make some comments in connexion with the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Thomas, at our 210th meeting regarding the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and the "nuclear umbrella". That statement cannot remain unanswered, not because Mr. Thomas said anything new or constructive, or because he put forward any fresh idea that would give hope of a change for the better in the position of the Western Powers on this key question of the whole programme of general and complete disarmament. That, unfortunately was not the case. The statement made by Mr. Thomas deserves attention for another reason: it was very illuminating in that it expressed in a particularly distinct and

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

conspicuous manner the very essence of the position of the Western Powers on questions of general and complete disarmament -- a position which, as we endeavoured to show in our statement on the same day (ENDC/PV.210, pp.14 et seq.), is precisely the obstacle in the way of coming to terms and reaching an agreement.

First of all, what strikes one in Mr. Thomas's statement is the vehement attack which the representative of the United Kingdom made on our proposal to eliminate in the first stage of general and complete disarmament all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles with the exception of a strictly limited, agreed "nuclear umbrella". It is not the first time such an attack has been made by the Western Powers. For three years running the Committee has been discussing this proposal, and for three years running the Western Powers, with a stubbornness worthy of a better cause, have been trying to prove that it is impossible to begin disarmament with measures which, if implemented, would eliminate the threat of nuclear war.

What can we say in this regard? Obviously, if one is striving not for disarmament but for the maintenance of the notorious "balance of armaments", the retention until the end of the process of disarmament of the capacity of States to wage nuclear war, then of course it would be unsuitable to begin by eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. But if one really wishes for disarmament, peace, the elimination of the threat of war, one is bound to recognize that to begin the process of disarmament with such a radical measure as the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is the most appropriate way of all. Unfortunately, such an approach to the problem of disarmament is still foreign to the Western Powers, and Mr. Thomas merely gave further evidence of this in his statement last Tuesday.

Just see how far Mr. Thomas went. He declared:

"Some representatives may be tempted to believe that the confidence required could be created by massive destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles as soon as possible. That is a view with which I have some sympathy; but it is a view which, unfortunately, I cannot accept. We believe that precipitate destruction of almost all nuclear delivery vehicles in such a short period of time as eighteen months could not fail to be disorderly, unbalanced and hence potentially dangerous. Indeed, it could well have precisely the opposite effect to that intended; it could lead to an early breakdown of the confidence built up before the beginning of the disarmament process". (ibid., pp.9,10)

Frankly, every word from Mr. Thomas is a revelation! On what are his assertions based? What did he put forward as proof, as justification for his conclusions? Just nothing; he adduced no data, no facts based on experience or practice. Indeed, he was

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

unable to adduce any, because they simply do not exist. According to Mr. Thomas, it appears that real disarmament measures, the implementation of which would eliminate the threat of war, might lead not to the strengthening of international confidence but to its breakdown, not to the consolidation of universal peace but an increase in the danger of war.

That is precisely what Mr. Thomas asserted on 25 August. If we followed the logic of Mr. Thomas, we should come to the conclusion that the true guarantee of peace is not disarmament, but the accumulation and retention, for the maximum length of time, of gigantic stockpiles of the most destructive types of weapons --- in other words the "balance of armaments", "the balance of nuclear terror". We can only express our gratitude to Mr. Thomas for the determination with which he revealed to the Committee the position of the Western Powers, which is deeply rooted in the shifting soil of the concept of the "balance of forces" --- that is, the nuclear arms race.

It is obvious that Mr. Thomas, basing himself on the doctrine of the "balance of armaments", could not accept the proposal to eliminate nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of general and complete disarmament. But now the times are such that Mr. Thomas could not state openly that the Western Powers were still striving to substitute for the idea of disarmament a concept aimed at the retention by the Western Powers of the material possibilities of launching and waging a nuclear war. Therefore Mr. Thomas tried to advance such arguments as would create the impression that the Western Powers reject the proposal to eliminate nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage, not because they do not wish to put an end to the policy of the arms race and preparations for war, but because that proposal would not guarantee the necessary security of the Western Powers.

Mr. Thomas put forward arguments about a so-called "upsetting of the strategic balance", the "numerical superiority" of the armed forces of the Soviet Union, the command structure of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries in comparison with those of NATO, and so on. All these arguments have been put forward many times in the past here in the Committee by the representatives of the Western Powers; they have all proved to be unsubstantiated and artificial or merely based on quibbles.

Thus two years ago, at the 63rd and 74th meetings of the Committee, we exposed the version excogitated by the Western Powers to the effect that the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles at the first stage of general and complete disarmament would place the Western Powers in a strategically disadvantageous position in comparison with

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

the socialist countries which, they alleged, would have a numerical superiority in respect of armed forces. Already at that time we drew the attention of the Committee to the fact that this so-called "numerical superiority" was simply an invention of the Western Powers.

Let us take another example — Mr. Thomas's assertion that the security of the Western Powers might somehow be infringed by the Soviet proposal to prohibit, right from the first stage of disarmament, joint military manoeuvres by the armed forces of several States. It is well known that the implementation of the proposal contained in the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament would entail the prohibition of large-scale joint military manoeuvres during the process of general and complete disarmament, both for the armed forces of NATO and for those of the Warsaw Treaty. Truly it is a cause of wonder that Mr. Thomas should venture to defend the right to carry out, during the disarmament process, such a flagrant form of military preparations as large-scale joint manoeuvres by the armed forces of the countries of the NATO bloc.

Let us take another of Mr. Thomas's assertions. He said that the Soviet proposal for the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and for a "nuclear umbrella" in the first stage "is unrelated to adequate and effective peace-keeping arrangements."

(ENDC/PV.210, p.11) How is it possible to make such an assertion, which is blatantly contrary to the facts and the true situation? The Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.I), in its chapter III entitled "Measures to safeguard the security of States", provides for the implementation, from the very first day of the first stage of disarmament, of such measures as restrictions on the movement of means of delivering nuclear weapons, control over launchings of rockets for peaceful purposes, prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons, and prohibition of nuclear tests of any kind, as well as a whole number of measures aimed at reducing the danger of an outbreak of war and measures to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security, including the implementation of the very important provisions of Article 43 of the United Nations Charter under which States would make available to the Security Council armed forces, assistance and facilities.

All this, of course, was well known to Mr. Thomas when he spoke at the 210th meeting of the Committee on 25 August. If, nevertheless, he had recourse to such unfounded "reasons" and "arguments", it was merely because he — like other representatives of the Western Powers, incidentally — had no serious and wellfounded arguments

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

against our proposals. They still do not wish to accept our proposals, because that would involve renouncing the Western doctrine of the "balance of armaments", the policy of the arms race and military preparations.

It is impossible not to see that, even regardless of the unsoundness of the arguments advanced by Mr. Thomas against our proposals, the very nature of his arguments reveals the fallacious approach of the representatives of the Western Powers to the problem of disarmament. In speaking of disarmament they, like Mr. Thomas, use and are guided by exclusively military and strategic considerations and calculations. Listening to Mr. Thomas, one might have thought that we were at a session of the NATO Council, not in a committee conducting negotiations on disarmament. Indeed, the United Kingdom representative insisted on the right of the Western Powers to carry out, in conditions of disarmament --- and I call your attention to this aspect of the matter --- to carry out, in conditions of disarmament, joint military manoeuvres. Further, Mr. Thomas, in speaking about military co-operation between allies, considered the possibility of a blow aimed at reserves in the rear, and compared the conditions of the use of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.

One cannot help asking the question: what is the representative of the United Kingdom driving at, what is he seeking to secure, what is he guided by in defending the right to carry out such military measures during the disarmament process? It is obvious that all this derives from the aim of the Western Powers that disarmament should not prevent the retention of armaments, should not prevent the maintenance of the so-called "balance of armaments". The Western Powers would approach a world in the process of disarming, and even a world that had already disarmed, with exactly the same yardstick as at the present time when there is no treaty on general and complete disarmament, when the arms race is going on at top speed, and military preparations are being carried out with ever greater intensity.

At our meeting of 25 August the representative of the United Kingdom stated that the Western Powers considered that peace and security during the disarmament process depended on maintaining the stability of the balance of nuclear deterrent power (ENDC/PV.210, pp.9 et seq.). This means that the Western Powers substitute for disarmament the maintenance of the stability of the balance of nuclear weapons. But on this basis, along this path, it is impossible to arrive at disarmament; that should be quite clear to all of us.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

So long as the Western Powers maintain this position -- the position of the "balance of armaments" --- and not the position of ensuring equal conditions of security for all States on the basis of disarmament, it is obvious that the world will remain under the threat of a thermonuclear war and that the cause of disarmament will remain in an impasse. It was precisely this aspect of the matter that Pope Paul VI pointed out in the statement he made a few days ago. He said:

"There is a return of the illusory concept that peace can be based only on the terrifying power of extremely lethal weapons; and while, on the one hand, discussions and work are being carried on nobly but weakly to limit and abolish armaments, on the other hand the destructive capacity of military devices is being continually developed and improved."

The same statement by Pope Paul VI contains a clear reference to the attempts to apply the concept of military balance in relations between States. I shall quote this passage in the Pope's statement as it was published in the Press:

"We are now witnessing this disturbing phenomenon: the crumbling of some of the fundamental principles on which peace must be based and the firm possession of which was thought to have been achieved after the tragic experiences of the two world wars. At the same time we see the rebirth of certain dangerous criteria which are once again serving to guide a short-sighted quest for equilibrium -- or rather, an unstable truce in the relations of nations and of the ideologies of peoples with one another."

From these quotations it is perfectly clear what Pope Paul has in mind: namely, that the security of States and peace can be ensured only through genuine disarmament and not by means of the armaments race and military preparations, not by maintaining a balance of armaments.

It is time that the Western Powers realized that they are making a great mistake -- unless it is merely a deliberate manifestation of their lack of good will -- if they consider that their disarmament plan, based on the concept of the maintenance of military balance and leading to the retention of the material possibilities of waging a thermonuclear war till the very end of the disarmament process, is in accordance with the hopes of the peoples. The Western Powers should bow to the demands of the overwhelming majority of mankind and adopt an effective plan of general and complete disarmament, instead of trying to substitute for disarmament the idea of maintaining a balance of forces, a balance of nuclear armaments.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Since we have dealt today with the statement made by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Thomas, we cannot disregard the fact that once again, as on many occasions in the past, he has expressed a desire to be given a more detailed and concrete idea of the "nuclear umbrella" which, in going forward to meet the Western Powers, we have proposed should be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States until the end of the whole disarmament process. Mr. Thomas has asked once again how many missiles we have in mind for retention in the "nuclear umbrella", what would be the power of the retained warheads, how verification of these missiles would be carried out and so forth. We have already given our answers to these questions, and it should be pointed out that we have never denied, nor do we deny, that some of these questions do indeed arise; they need to be studied and agreed, and it is obvious that this could not be done without bringing in competent technical experts.

But before proceeding to agree upon and specify these technical details, it is essential that the Committee should approve in principle the proposal for a "nuclear umbrella"; and after it has done so it would be possible to set up a working group and to study in this group all the practical questions that arise. Unfortunately, however, the Western Powers, as is evident from the position adopted by their representatives in the Committee, do not want anything of the kind. All the statements made by Mr. Thomas and by the United States representatives about the "nuclear umbrella" proposal being insufficiently concrete, insufficiently detailed, are merely subterfuges to avoid solving the problem.

Incidentally, we should like to point out that in these conditions we think that it is hardly possible to expect any positive results from the establishment of a "preliminary working group" to determine the terms of reference for the working group and the methods of solving the problems placed before it. The establishment of such a "preliminary working group", without any agreed basis on the substance of the question of a "nuclear umbrella", and moreover while there are clearly-manifested differences of principle in this regard, would inevitably foredoom also this "preliminary working group" to fruitless discussions, which would immediately get into an impasse because it would in fact have no subject to consider.

In such conditions the establishment of a "preliminary working group" might give rise to the illusion that something had been agreed in the Committee on the question of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, whereas in fact, as a result of the negative position of the Western Powers on this key question of the programme of general and complete disarmament, we find ourselves in an impasse. The Soviet delegation is

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

profoundly convinced that, for the future prospects of the disarmament negotiations, it would be better if we told the nations and reported to the General Assembly the naked, unadorned truth why it has not been possible in the Committee after three years' work to make any progress in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

It has been said here that, if we do not set up any working group, the work of the Committee may become the subject of criticism at the United Nations General Assembly. But why should we fear justified and well-deserved criticism? After all, it is a fact that in the very substance of the question, in the approach to the problem of general and complete disarmament, there are radical, fundamental differences between the positions of the two sides. So far it has proved impossible in the Committee to overcome these differences. Perhaps it will be possible to do so when the problem of general and complete disarmament becomes once again the subject of a broad discussion by all the countries concerned during the United Nations General Assembly.

The Soviet Union does not fear criticism at the General Assembly; we have no reason to fear it. But we do not consider that criticism of the work of our Committee at the General Assembly is an end in itself -- criticism for the sake of criticism. We assume that such criticism should help towards finding ways and means of moving forward. At the same time we consider that, now that the Committee is approaching the end of its work for 1964, and only a few meetings remain before the recess, if in this short interval of time the Western Powers were to show at least some signs of abandoning, in regard to disarmament questions, the fallacious doctrine of the "balance of armaments", the "balance of terror", it can safely be said that the Committee would be able to report to the General Assembly an emergent hope of agreement after three years of fruitless discussions. The Soviet delegation sincerely wishes for such a turning-point in the work of our Committee.

Mr. TAHOURDIN (United Kingdom): I will not detain the Committee today by answering all the points which the Soviet representative has sought to make against the speech which was made in this Committee by my Minister of State, Mr. Thomas, a week ago (ENDC/PV.210, pp.5 et seq.). I reserve the right of my delegation to do so as far as may be necessary after we have studied in the verbatim record Mr. Tsarapkin's remarks.

I should like to say now, however, that most of Mr. Tsarapkin's attack seems to be misdirected against a thesis which has never been advanced by the West: that there should be a balance of armaments instead of disarmament. We have not suggested that.

(Mr. Tahourdin, United Kingdom)

The Soviet representative has been knocking down a man of straw of his own creation. What we have said, and still say, is that there must be balance during disarmament. This thesis seems to us to be self-evident, and Mr. Tsarapkin has not in our view said anything to refute it.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): If no one else wishes to speak, I should like in my capacity as representative of Italy to make a few brief comments on the statements we have heard today.

I listened with particular attention to the statement made this morning by the Canadian representative, Mr. Burns, who, availing himself of the rules of procedure, made a fresh contribution to our work by speaking of a matter which, though not new to us, had not been considered by our Committee for some time.

My delegation attaches the greatest importance to the problem of peace-keeping machinery and of international peace forces. The achievement of general and complete disarmament may be said to depend on three things: balance, control and the organization of collective security. It is difficult to see how important steps could be taken towards disarmament without organizing -- at all events in a rudimentary form -- a system of collective security. Hence the consideration of this problem -- even at this stage of our discussions -- is certainly not out of place and deserves to be given some priority.

We have, I believe, a mandate from the United Nations to continue discussion of the organization of collective security; but it is perhaps premature to go into that problem deeply, and I shall revert to it on another occasion.

We also heard this morning speeches by the delegations of Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, whose statements on the subject of the working group were, in my view, to be deplored. Unless I am mistaken, Mr. Lukanov had recourse to arguments which date back to 1960, to the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, to show that even then the Western delegations did not want general and complete disarmament; and he intimated that the Western delegations have in substance never changed their views since. I should like to point out to Mr. Lukanov that he did not tell us that in 1960 the five Western Powers had submitted a complete draft plan for general and complete disarmament (TNDC/3) which the Eastern delegations refused even to consider, for they were absolutely opposed to agreements on partial measures of disarmament -- or collateral measures as they are now called.

It seemed to be Mr. Tsarapkin's aim, too, to show that the Western delegations would oppose general and complete disarmament, serious disarmament; or at least that they would not make adequate efforts to achieve it. For my part I believe that, without

(The Chairman, Italy)

undue repetition, the Western delegations' position was expressed very clearly --- I would also say, very flexibly --- this morning by the United States representative, Mr. Timberlake. He reiterated that the treaty on general and complete disarmament to be agreed by us would be neither the United States outline nor the Soviet draft. As I remember, he said: "We do not expect that any plan eventually agreed to will be unchanged from its original draft." (supra, p.20) Thus the United States delegation reaffirmed that we are always open to any formula of conciliation and will not refuse to consider any proposal which may be presented.

As I see it, the discouraging part of Mr. Tsarapkin's speech is his apparent attempt to call in question again certain basic principles of disarmament, including that of balance. All know that we must take the existing balance as a starting-point for the application of disarmament. All know that this balance contains elements which are favourable to some and unfavourable to others. All know that the balance of armaments is not the best way of ensuring peace, but that, until we conclude an agreement on disarmament here, the balance of armaments is unfortunately the best method there is for preserving peace. All know that we want this balance to be brought down to ever-lower levels, without any of the parties obtaining a military advantage which would be a threat to the security of all and to peace. Those are principles which have been accepted by the United Nations, principles which are well known and which should really no longer be called into question here.

Mr. Tsarapkin --- I apologize for not being able to quote his words --- also spoke about various military measures, military alliances, and the preservation of armaments, accusing the West of wanting to preserve their armaments, carry out joint manoeuvres, maintain their alliances and so forth. In this connexion I should like to state yet again that we wish to do all in our power to ensure that all armaments and all military arrangements are eliminated without delay, but, naturally, through a balanced and controlled process of disarmament. That is why we are always quite perplexed when we hear proposals which are inspired, as Mr. Timberlake said this morning, by slogans rather than by practical needs.

Mr. Tsarapkin concluded his statement this morning with an eloquent quotation from a recent utterance by His Holiness Pope Paul VI. I should like to appeal to him to follow those noble exhortations from so high a source, for they were aimed not merely at material disarmament, but also at spiritual disarmament and at instilling peace and love

(The Chairman, Italy)

of one's neighbour in the souls of all men. That is what we are trying to do, humbly but in full awareness that we are carrying out our human and religious duties.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 212th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Francesco Cavaletti, representative of Italy.

"Statements were made by the representatives of India, Bulgaria, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Soviet Union and Italy.

"The Committee decided to adjourn this session of the Conference following its plenary meeting on 17 September 1964. The Committee also decided to resume its meetings in Geneva as soon as possible after termination of the consideration of disarmament at the nineteenth session of the General Assembly, on a date to be decided by the two co-Chairmen after consultation with the members of the Committee.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 3 September 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

